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STuDENT NomS
but that Section 29 and the First Amendment to the Constitution limits
this right where the issue of freedom of speech is involved.
Specifically, it would be noted in the Brinkley case that (1) advertising is not free speech; (2) that the denial of a license to operate because of the general character of the programs offered by a
station has nothing to do with freedom of speech although it does, of
course, necessarily involve censorship of such programs.
In the Shuler case it would be noted that (1) the commission did
not purport to pass judgment upon the general character of the programs offered by the station, but confined itself exclusively to the three
hours during which Shuler broadcast; (2) that comment upon religion,
public officials, civic organizations and affairs, comes definitely under
the heading of freedom of speech, and that the guaranty in Section 29
of the radio act and in the First Amendment to the Constitution would
therefore apply.
BYRON PUMPHRET.
TAxATIoN: ARE COLLEGE SocIAL FRATERNITIES EXEmPT FRmO TAXATION UNDER SECTION 170 OF THE KENTUCKY CoNsTITUTION?-Section 170
of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "there shall be exempt
from taxation . . . institutions of education not used or employed for
gain by any person or corporation, and the income of which is devoted
solely to the cause of education."
Our problem is to determine whether college social fraternities in
Kentucky are exempt from taxation under the above constitutional
provision.
For the past half century college fraternities [using the word
"fraternity" in its generic sense which includes organizations composed of either or both sexes, State v. Allen, 189 Ind. 369, 127 N. E. 145
(1920)], have been playing an increasingly important part in the educational systems of the United States, and of Kentucky. These organizations play an active part in determining the policies of the schools of
which they are a part; they are a part of our ever progressing training of men and women to become better adapted to fight life's battles.
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary defines "education" as the importation or acquisition of knowledge, skill or discipline of character.
In the case of German Gymnastic Ass'n of Louisville v. City of Louisville, 117 Ky. 958, 80 S. W. 201 (1904), the court, holding that a physical
culture school was an educational institution within the meaning of
Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution, cited with approval the case
of Ruohs v. Backer, 6 Heisk (Tenn.) 395, 19 Am. Rep. 598 (1871), which
held that in its broadest sense education comprehends not merely the
instruction received at school or college, but the whole course of training, moral, intellectual, or physical.
Who would deny that a college social fraternity falls within the
broad definitions of education as given by the dictionary and by the
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Kentucky and Tennessee courts above? In the case of State v. Allen,
supra, the Indiana court, in holding a fraternity exempt from taxation
under a constitutional provision exempting property used for educational purposes, said that a Greek ]etter fraternity in a college is
dominantly an educational institution-the students pursue in the fraternity house the course of study prescribed by the university; they
are subject to the rules and regulations of the university. The court,
in refutation of the contention that a fraternity was primarily a rooming house for the members thereof-Phi Beta Epsilon Corporation v.
The City of Boston, 182 Mass. 457, 65 N. E. 824 (1903); Knox College
v. Board of Review of Knox County, 308 Ill. 160, 139 N. E. 56 (1923)paid that "because some members of this fraternity board and sleep
in this building, and pay what it costs to run the building, does not
make the dominant use boarding and lodging. Every human being
must eat and sleep to live; but this does not make the dominant purpose in life eating and sleeping." The dominant purpose to which property is put is determining as to whether or not property falls within
a tax exemption clause. People v. Omega Chapter of Psi Upsilon Fraternity, 335 Ill. 317, 167 N. E. 16 (1929).
Although generally there must be a strict construction of taxation exemption clauses, yet the bltter rule is that a liberal, rather than
a strict, construction shall be given to provisions for exemytion of
educational, religious, and charitable property or institutions. 2 Cooley,
Taxation (4th ed.), sec. 673; State v. Fish University, 87 Tenn. 281,
10 S. W. 286 (1889); Adams County v. Catholic Diocese of Natchez, 110
Miss. 890, 71 So. 17 (1916). Contra: Griswold v. Quinn, 97 Kan. 611,
156 Pac. 761 (1916). As far as the writer has been able to ascertain,
there are no cases expressly stating Kentucky's stand on the matter,
but it is reasonable to infer that Kentucky would line up with the said
better view because, in the case of Cor. v. Berea College, 149 Ky. 95,
147 S. W. 929 (1912), the court, in holding exempt from taxation under
Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution, a laundry, a printing shop,
a hotel, a supply store, and other properties operated in connection
with the college, such institutions being maintained for the purpose
of affording the students a means of livelihood and for the purpose of
giving them industrial training, evidently did not construe the said
constitutional provision very strictly. In the case of Louisville College
of Pharmacy v. City of Louisville, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 825, 82 S. W. 610
(1904), the court, in holding that the school of pharmacy was an educational institution within the meaning of Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution, said that "the Constitutional Convenion did not use
the words 'institutions of education' in any narrow or restricted sense.
It was used in its broadest and most comprehensive sense." It has
been shown supra that it would not be unreasonable to, rather that
it would be unreasonable not to, include the college fraternities in the
broad definition of educational institutions. Thus would not the Ken-
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tucky Court of Appeals hold that a college fraternity is an educational
Institution within the meaning of Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution?
A fraternity is not run for profit. The members thereof pay only
so much as is necessary to defray the actual operating expenses of the
institution. In Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution, we find that
the educational institutions which are exempt from taxation are those
educational institutions, "the income of which is devoted solely to the
cause of education." The Illinois Supreme Court, in the case of People
v. Omega Chapter of Psi Upsilon Fraternity, supra, held that, despite
the fact that the phrase "exclusively for school purposes" was used in
an educational institution taxation exemption clause, yet "primarily
for school purposes" was meant. Solely and exclusively are practically
synonymous terms. Would it not be logical to say that the said phrase
in the Kentucky Constitution means "the income of which is devoted
primarily to the cause of education"? We have seen that the better
view Is that the primary purpose of a fraternity is educational. State
v. Allen, supra. To use solely in the said Kentucky Constitutional provision in a very strict sense would mean that, if one cent of the income
of an educational institution were used for anything other than the
cause of education, such educational institution would be deprived of
the taxation exemption which the Constitutional Convention intended
for It; it would create a gross injustice. We have seen supra that
taxation exemption clauses relating to educational institutions are to
be given a very liberal interpretation.
Of course it will be contended that there are salaries paid to some
employees of a fraternity, and hence, in a sense, the fraternity is run
for the gain of those persons, taking away the fraternity's right to
tax exemption. But the Kentucky Court of Appeals, in the case of
Cor. v. Hamilton College, 125 Ky. 329, 101 S. W. 405 (1907), expressly
repudiated this contention when it said that the constitutional provision under consideration does not mean that no person connected
with an educational institution shall receive private gain, for to so contend would be to contend that the exemption from taxation of educational institutions was a nullity-someone in practically all educational
institutions is compensated for his services.
In the case of Beta Theta Pi Corp. v. Board of Comrs. of Cleveland
County, 108 Okla. 78, 234 Pac. 354 (1925), a statute exempting fraternities from taxation was held to be not contra to a constitutional
provision [Sec. 6, Art. 10 of the state constitution, adopting a statute of the Oklahoma Territory, which provided that the only property
to be exempt from taxation is "the grounds and buildings of . . .
(and) colleges ... devoted solely to apbenevolent ... institutions ....
propriate objects of these institutions . . . and not leased or otherwise
used with a view of pecuniary profit."], the court saying that the pur-
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pose of a college fraternity is to promote educational, moral and social
culture, and that a fraternity is not run for pecuniary profit.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Omega Chapter of Psi
Upsilon Fraternity, supra, held that college fraternities were exempt
from taxation under Illinois Statutes, Ch. 120, Sec. 2, which exempted
from taxation "all property used exclusively for school . .. purposes
. . . and not used with a view of profit." This case, whose decision
was based on a statute which is almost identical with Section 170 of
the Kentucky Constitution, represents the better modern attitude
toward college fraternities as educational institutions, as evidenced by
the fact that, although the court made no mention of the case of Knox
College v. Board of Review of Knox County, supra, yet, as it is of a
later date, it must be given precedence over the Knox College case.
From the foregoing, this writer is of the opinion that the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, in the event the question of whether college fraternities are exempt from taxation under Section 170 of the Kentucky
Constitution comes before them for adjudication, should hold that they
are exempt.
WILLIAM MELLOIL

TAXATION-CAN COLLEGE FRATERNrTY PRoPRTY BE ExE.PuT IN

KEN-

TUeCY?--CoNTRA Vnw.--Section 170 of the Kentucky Constitution deal-

ing with exemptions from taxation, exempts "institutions of purely
public charity and institutions of education not used or employed for
gain by any person or corporation, and the income from which is devoted solely to the cause of education."
Does college fraternity property come within the exemption? Is
a fraternity house an institution of purely public charity, or an institution of education within the meaning of Section 170?
While there are no cases bearing directly on the subject in Kentucky, a study of the constitutional provision and similar constitutional
provisions in other states where cases have arisen, leads one to believe
that college fraternity property does not come within the exemption,
and that a statute exempting such property from taxation would be
invalid.
A leading case, People v. Alpha Phi of Phi Kappa Sigma Educational Association of University of Chicago, 326 ll. 573, 158 N. E. 213
(1927), holds that a fraternity is not a public charity, although it may
be the means of helping some members through school. Only members
of the fraternity are benefitted thereby, and they are chosen under rules
of the societies themselves and not by virtue of attendance at the school.
To constitute a public charity, the benefit must not be conferred on
definite persons, or defined individuals, but must be conferred on indefinite persons composing the public, or some part of the public; but
the indefinite clause may be one sex, or the inhabitants of a particular
city or town, or members of particular religious or secular organiza-

